Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

The State of Utah v. Michael Todd McArthur :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joanne C. Slotnick; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. McArthur, No. 981421 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1723

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981421-CA
Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Burglary, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995),
and Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-404 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, Judge, presiding.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAN GRAHAM (1321)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. 0. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 2 2 1999
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I. AIMEE WAS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHO SEIZED
ITEMS IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. . . . .
A. AIMEE WAS ACTING AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHEN
SHE SEIZED AND REMOVED ITEMS FROM APPELLANT'S
HOME

4

4

B. PERMISSIVE ACCESS TO THE HOUSE DOES NOT
PRECLUDE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

11

C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAUSED BY
AIMEE ACTING AS AN AGENT AND SEIZING ITEMS
TAINTED THE SEARCH WARRANT AND REQUIRES
SUPPRESSION OF THE ITEMS SEIZED PURSUANT TO
THAT WARRANT

16

POINT II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AIMEE WAS ACTING AS
AN AGENT, THE AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE
CAUSE WHEN THE MATERIAL OMISSIONS ARE INCLUDED WITH
THE INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT.

19

POINT III. THE CLAIM THAT INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
MADE BY APPELLANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS THE FRUIT OF
THE POISONOUS TREE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. .

21

CONCLUSION

25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)

20

Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909)

20

State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992)

22

State v. Anonymous, 379 A.2d 946 (Conn. 1977)

17

State v. Becich, 509 P.2d 1232 (Or. 1973)

16

State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998)

15

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)

23

State v. Kourv, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991)

...

2,5,8,
11, 12, 16

State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996)

23

State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1989),
cert, denied,

795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990)

23

State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)

25

State v. Viqh, 871 P.2d 1030 (Utah App. 1994)

17

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988)
United States v. Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094 (9th
Cir. 1982)
United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803 (1983),
aff'd,
729 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied,
469 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 572,
83 L.Ed.2d 512 (1984)

2, 4, 5,
6, 9, 14,
16
7, 8

2, 11, 12,
13, 14

United States v. Chukwubike, 956 F.2d 209 (9th
Cir.), cert, denied,
504 U.S. 945,
112 S.Ct. 2288, 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992)

7, 8

United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643 (9th Cir.
1979)

7, 8

ii

Page
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.
1994)

8, 9

Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S.Ct. 407, 371
U.S. 471 (1963)

21, 22

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. Evid. 103(a)

23

Amend. IV, U.S. Const

passim

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 981421-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The state concedes that Officer Delahunty knew of and
acquiesced in Aimee Rolfe's conduct in searching McArthur's home.
The circumstances relevant to the knowledge/acquiescence inquiry
strongly demonstrate that Aimee acted as an agent for Delahunty
because, among other things, Delahunty gave Aimee direction and
guidance and agreed that she should enter the home and steal
items while he waited in the driveway.
In light of the state's concession, the only inquiry for
this Court is whether Aimee had an independent personal reason
which was her primary motivation for conducting the search and
which significantly outweighed Delahunty's knowledge of and
acquiescence in the search so as to render Aimee's search an
independent rather than agency action.

The reason the state

attributed to Aimee for conducting the search--to come clean and
get her life in order--necessarily involves helping the police
obtain evidence against McArthur and is not an independent
personal motivation.

This reason contrasts with the legitimate

independent reasons which have been upheld by other courts.

Even

if Aimee's motivation was considered to be mixed, the personal
aspects of her motivation do not outweigh the knowledge/
acquiescence circumstances so as to render Aimee's search a
personal independent action rather than a search as a police
agent.
Aimee's permissive access to the house does not end the
Fourth Amendment inquiry.

The state relies completely on this

Court's decision in State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991)
to support its claim that since Aimee had permissive access to
the house, the issue of whether she was a police agent need not
be decided.

However, Koury simply held that a private individual

who had the right to be inside a house could "report what he
observed in defendant's house."

Koury, 824 P.2d at 478.

The

decision in Koury was based on United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d
803, 806 (1983), aff'd,

729 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,

469

U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 572, 83 L.Ed.2d 512 (1984), which supports
Appellant's claim that an individual can act as a police agent,
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though she has
permission to be in a house.
Additionally, the Supreme Court decision in State v. Watts,
750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1988) mandates that officers cannot
have "informants do for them what they cannot legally do
themselves."

Id.

This mandate would be violated if Officer

Delahunty could send Aimee as an agent into the house to search
and be free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny because she was a
guest in the house.

Moreover, assuming Aimee had permission to
2

be in the house, such permission did not include permission to
enter as a police agent and conduct a search.

Aimee's actions

exceeded the scope of any permission she might have had;
Appellant did not consent to a search by Aimee.

Additionally,

Aimee could not have consented to a search and therefore could
not conduct one herself as a police agent.
The search warrant was obtained as the fruit of the
poisonous tree and therefore must be suppressed.

Moreover, if

the illegally seized evidence is excised and all omitted
information considered, the affidavit failed to establish
probable cause.
The state incorrectly maintains that if this Court
determines Aimee Rolfe was not an agent for Delahunty, "then the
Fourth Amendment has no applicability."

See state's brief

("S.B.") at 9-10, 22. Even if Aimee was not an agent, Delahunty
omitted material information, including, among other things,
information regarding Aimee's forgery charges and possible
involvement in the burglary.

Contrary to the state's claim that

the omitted information would have bolstered Aimee's credibility,
it is well accepted that statements of a co-defendant are
inherently unreliable.

Aimee did not implicate herself and

instead pointed her finger at McArthur.

A magistrate who knew

that Aimee had charges for forgery, a crime of dishonesty,
involving checks taken in the burglary and the other information
outlined in Appellant's opening brief ("A.O.B.") would have
questioned Aimee's reliability.

Delahunty's actions in not
3

obtaining a search warrant based only on Aimee's word emphasize
the importance of this information and demonstrate that he acted
intentionally or recklessly in failing to include the
information.
McArthur entered a conditional plea preserving
of the legality of the search warrant."

R. 51.

l!

[t]he issue

Pursuant to the

conditional plea, reversal is required if the search warrant did
not establish probable cause in light of the omissions or was
obtained as the fruit of Aimee's conduct as a police agent.
Additionally, the claim that the confession was the fruit of the
Fourth Amendment violation was preserved in the trial court and
by the conditional plea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. AIMEE WAS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHO SEIZED ITEMS
IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
A. AIMEE WAS ACTING AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHEN SHE
SEIZED AND REMOVED ITEMS FROM APPELLANT'S HOME.
(Reply to Point 1(a) of the State's Brief)
The state concedes that Officer Delahunty knew of and
acquiesced in Aimee Rolfe's conduct in entering Appellant's home
and seizing items.

S.B. at 9-10, 14.

Hence, the first inquiry

under the test articulated in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-22 weighs
in favor of suppression.
The state attempts to minimize the weight of the
circumstances demonstrating that Officer Delahunty knew of and
acquiesced in Aimee's conduct by equating his knowledge/
acquiescence with the act of simply relying on informants.
4

S.B.

at 14-15.

The state argues that "the mere fact that Officer

Delahunty [worked with an informant] should be insufficient to
establish an agency relationship" and that "the inquiry must
proceed to an analysis of the intent and purpose underlying
[Aimee] Rolfe's conduct and to the subsidiary issues identified
by this Court in Koury."

S.B. at 14-15.

This case involves more than the simple reliance on
informants for information which was referred to in Watts, 750
P.2d at 1221.

Instead, it involves conduct by Officer Delahunty

demonstrating he knew of and acquiesced in the search, and
strongly indicating that Aimee acted as his agent.

In fact,

Delahunty testified that "she obtained [the] property for [him]
on June 30th."

R. 114:43.

Although the Supreme Court recognized in Watts that an
officer can obtain information from informants without creating
an agency relationship, it clarified that under the totality of
the circumstances, the seizure in that case was the independent
act of a private individual and not the act of a government agent
only because "[t]he police did not give the informant any
direction or guidance, nor did they tell him to enter anyone's
property or do anything illegal to obtain evidence."
P.2d at 1220.

Watts, 750

In contrast, in the instant case, none of these

three criteria were met:

(1) Officer Delahunty gave Aimee

direction and guidance by taking her to the house and indicating
that she should remove certain specified items; Aimee's search
would not have occurred if Delahunty had not taken her to the
5

house and agreed that she should remove specific items and bring
them to him (R. 114:18, 24-5, 28, 64-5); (2) Officer Delahunty
.agreed that Aimee should enter the home, and made it possible for
her to do so by picking her up in West Jordan, transporting her
across the valley to the McArthur house, and waiting in the
driveway (R. 114:23, 27-8, 46-7); (3) Officer Delahunty indicated
Aimee should steal items from the house when he agreed that she
should enter and remove the items (R. 114:65), thereby telling
her to do something illegal.

The circumstances surrounding

Officer Delahunty's knowledge of and acquiescence in Aimee's
conduct weigh heavily in favor of a determination that Aimee was
a government agent and should not be given the cursory attention
suggested by the state.
In light of the state's concession and the facts supporting
that concession, the only determination left for this Court is
whether the facts related to the motivational inquiry, "the
intent and purpose of the person(s) or body(ies) conducting the
search" (Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2), weigh so strongly against
concluding that Aimee was an agent that they outweigh the
circumstances demonstrating that Delahunty knew of and acquiesced
in Aimee's conduct.
The state claims that Aimee "was acting for the most part on
her own" and that her motivation was primarily personal.
15.

S.B. at

The state bases this claim on Delahunty's hearsay testimony

that Aimee told him she "wanted to come clean and get her life in
order" and knew what she had done in the past was wrong, and the
6

state's speculation that Aimee was trying to make a final break
with McArthur and get a fresh start.

S.B. at 15.

The way Aimee intended to come clean and get her life in
order was by helping police collect evidence against Appellant.
This necessarily involves a motivation to help police.

Aimee's

intent in entering McArthur's house and taking the items was to
seize items for police.

Hence, Aimee's intent was to act as an

instrument or agent of the police; although she hoped her actions
would improve her life, that desire was not independent of her
intent to aid police.
Aimee's purported desire to get her life in order by helping
police gather evidence contrasts with the legitimate independent
motivations which have been upheld.

See e.g. United States v.

Andrini, 685 F.2d 1094, 1097-8 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Gomez, 614 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Chukwubike, 956 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert, denied,

504 U.S. 945,

112 S.Ct. 2288, 119 L.Ed.2d 212 (1992).
In Andrini, a motel clerk opened a suitcase that had no
identification tags and which had been delivered to the wrong
guest.

The independent motivation for conducting the search was

to follow routine procedure so as to ascertain the owner.

In

fact, although an officer was nearby when the clerk opened the
bag, the officer had not told the clerk of the officer's belief
that the bag belonged to Andrini.

Andrini, 685 F.2d at 1097-8;

see also Gomez, 614 F.2d at 644-5 (routine search of bag without
identification tags to ascertain owner was based on independent
7

motivation).

By contrast, in the present case, Aimee knew that

she was taking evidence for the officer and was motivated by her
desire to aid the officer and the subsidiary impact of such
assistance on her quality of life.
Chukwubike is similar to Andrini and Gomez in that the
motivation for the search was independent from a desire to help
police.

Doctors removed numerous balloons filled with heroin in

order to save Chukwubike's life after Chukwubike swallowed the
heroin balloons.

956 F.2d at 211.

Unlike the present case where

any motivation Aimee had to better her life was dependent on
helping the police gather evidence, the private citizens in
Gomez, Andrini and Chukwubike had an independent reason for
conducting the procedure, and would have opened the suitcase or
conducted the operation regardless of whether it would have aided
officers.

See also United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th

Cir. 1994)(crime prevention is not a personal motivation
independent of a motivation to help police).

Because Aimee would

not have conducted the search and removed the items absent
Officer Delahunty's agreement and involvement, her purported
desire to get her life in order was not an independent personal
motivation.
Both this Court and the state recognize that the motivation
of an individual who conducts a search is likely to be mixed.
S.B. at 15 n. 10; Koury, 824 P.2d at 478 n. 2.

Because of this

mixed motivation, in analyzing the motivational inquiry, the
Supreme Court has considered whether the individual's actions
8

"were for the most part his own and were not substantially
motivated by the prompting and encouragement of the [police]."
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223.

Even if Aimee's motivations were

considered to be mixed, they were not "for the most part [her]
own" and were "substantially motivated by the prompting and
encouragement of police," since she would not have conducted the
search without the agreement and help of Officer Delahunty.

See

id.
Moreover, the conduct of the police officer impacts on the
motivational inquiry.

See Reed, 15 F.3d at 932 (officers who

were present during the search protected individual and
essentially served as lookouts; participation was significant and
indicated that motivation for search was primarily to aid
police).

In other words, where police officers assist, prompt or

encourage an individual to conduct a search, the motivation is
less likely to be primarily personal.
Although Delahunty indicated that Aimee came up with the
idea of searching McArthur's home and told Delahunty what items
she could take, Aimee would not have conducted the search without
Delahunty's prompting and encouragement.

Had Aimee turned the

items over to officers before Delahunty sought her out, or even
after she and Delahunty began meeting, but without Delahunty's
help and without waiting two weeks, the state might have more of
an argument that Aimee's motivation was primarily personal.
The facts show, however, that Aimee did not remove the items
of her own volition, did not approach police officers on her own,
9

and went to the police station to talk with Delahunty only after
he made her nervous by seeking her out and trying to talk with
her at the McArthur home.

R. 114:7, 17, 46, 65.

The facts also

show that during the two weeks between June 17, 1997, when Aimee
talked to Delahunty at the police station, and June 30, 1997, the
day Delahunty took her to the McArthur home to conduct a search,
Aimee did not act on her own to remove the items.

Instead, she

waited until Delahunty arranged the search and transported her to
the McArthur home.

Aimee relied on Delahunty's assistance in

transporting her as well as his assistance in waiting in the
driveway; if Aimee ran into problems while searching McArthur's
house, she had a police officer in the driveway to assist her.
Delahunty's assistance, encouragement and prompting were critical
to the search.
The state also claims that Delahunty did not "make offers of
reward or otherwise entice Rolfe to cooperate" and suggests
therefore that Aimee's motivation was personal.

S.B. at 17.

The

record is silent as to whether officers other than Delahunty
indicated Aimee might benefit or whether Aimee believed she might
benefit in regard to her own criminal charges if she helped
implicate Appellant.1

Even if the record clearly showed,

1

It is safe to assume that an individual in Aimee's
position, facing charges for forgery as well as the possibility
officers might think she was involved in the burglary, would think
that she might be better off in regard to her own criminal cases if
she were to help police officers. Delahunty indicated that "eighty
percent" of her reason for "coming forward" was that she was in
trouble.
R. 114:40.
Even without a specific offer, it is a
fiction to suggest that someone in Aimee's position would not think
that she might benefit from helping police.
10

however, that Aimee was not given offers or enticement, such a
fact works both ways in assessing whether motivation for the
search was personal.

Without reward, offers or enticement from

police, the motivation for conducting a search and turning
evidence over to police is arguably more apt to be based on a
desire to help officers than on personal motivation; the
motivation is to help police gather evidence rather than personal
gain.

On the other hand, if the officers pay or reward a person

to conduct a search, the person appears to be employed as an
agent.

Because this consideration is ambiguous, it should be

given little weight, especially where an officer has actively
assisted, prompted and encouraged the individual to conduct the
search, as occurred in this case.
The totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates
that Aimee acted as a police agent when she searched Appellant's
home and seized items.
B. PERMISSIVE ACCESS TO THE HOUSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION.
(Reply to Point 1(b) of the State's Brief)
The state claims that since Aimee had permissive access to
the house, her entry into the house and removal of items did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.

See S.B. at 18-22.

The state

bases this claim entirely on this Court's decision in Koury, 824
P.2d at 478.
In Koury, this Court relied on Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806 to
reach the conclusion that:

11

It is not illegal for a private individual, even if
acting as a government agent, to enter another's home
if he or she does so with the owner's permission. See
United States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 806 (1983)
aff'd,
729 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
469 U.S.
1075, 105 S.Ct. 572, 83 L.Ed.2d 512 (1984). It is not
necessary for us to decide if [the informant] was an
agent if his entry into defendant's home was
permissive. Id. We find no error in the court's
conclusion that [the informant's] entry into
defendant's house was not intrusive and therefore,
lawful. Accordingly, it was proper for him to report
what he observed in defendant's house.
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478.

Although this Court explicitly referred

only to an informant's report of his observations while a guest
in a home, the state maintains that the holding in Kourv applies
to the seizure of evidence by a guest, even if that guest is
acting as an agent of police, as well as the reporting of any
observations.

While the state is correct that the informant in

Kourv removed cocaine residue from the defendant's house, the
informant also reported observations he made during various
visits to the house.

This Court's opinion sidesteps the seizure

issue by referring only to the observations in its holding.

The

holding in Koury explicitly applies only to observations by
informants who have permissive access to an area, and does not
directly address the issue in this case of whether informants
with permissive access may conduct a search and seize items as a
police agent.
Moreover, Bennett does not say that a Fourth Amendment
violation does not occur if a police agent who has permissive
access conducts a search.

Instead, Bennett focuses on whether

the informant exceeded the scope of his instructions from police
12

officers by searching an area in which he did not have permission
to be.

Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806.

The lower court in Bennett

concluded that as long as the officers did not know that the
informant entered a bedroom without consent, no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred; in other words, the lower court determined
that as long as the officers reasonably believed that the
informant had permissive access to the bedroom, the Fourth
Amendment was not violated when the informant searched the
bedroom.
The appellate court concluded that the lower court's
rationale was incorrect and did not justify a refusal to
suppress.

Id.

Instead, the appellate court pointed out that the

government's acquiescence to the search was limited to areas
where the informant had permissive access; permissive access was
an issue in Bennett because the officers had told the informant
to search areas where he had permissive access.

Id.

The

appellate court remanded the case for a determination as to
whether the informant had permission to enter the bedroom, and,
if not, whether the informant's actions in the bedroom so
exceeded the officers' instructions that the informant "had lost
his status as an instrument of the Government when the challenged
photographs were taken."

Bennett, 709 F.2d at 806.

In summary, if the lower court in Bennett found on remand
that the informant had permissive access to the bedroom, the
informant was acting as an agent when he was in the bedroom since
officers had instructed him to search areas to which he had
13

permissive access.

Hence, while far from an example in clarity,

the Bennett decision appears to indicate that an individual who
has permissive access to a home or room and who searches that
area at the direction of the police, is a police agent for Fourth
Amendment purposes.

Bennett therefore supports Appellant's claim

that the Fourth Amendment was violated even though Aimee was a
guest in the house when she conducted the search.
In Watts, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourth Amendment
"preclude [s] law enforcement officers or agencies from having
informants do for them what they cannot legally do themselves."
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221.

The state's argument that the Fourth

Amendment is not implicated where officers direct an agent to
search an area to which the agent has permissive access
disregards this dictate.

Officer Delahunty could not search

McArthur's home; the Fourth Amendment precluded him from sending
an agent in to search that home and seize items even if that
agent otherwise had permission to enter as a guest.
While a determination that an individual had permissive
access to premises might impact on the knowledge/acquiescence and
motivational factors outlined in Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2,
standing alone, permissive access does not preclude Fourth
Amendment protection.

Indeed, such a rule would ignore the well

accepted Fourth Amendment requirement that the totality of the
circumstances be assessed in determining whether a violation
occurred.

See Watts, 750 P.2d at 1221-2.

Moreover, assuming Aimee had permission to be a guest in the
14

McArthur house, such permission did not include the permission to
conduct a search as an agent for police officers.

Nor did it

include permission to surreptitiously take items from the house.
Since Aimee acted as a police agent, McArthur would have had to
validly consent to the search in order to meet Fourth Amendment
requirements.

Permissive access to the premises did not end the

Fourth Amendment inquiry since Aimee's actions exceeded the scope
of any permissive access she had, and McArthur did not knowingly
and voluntarily consent to a search.
A determination of whether Aimee's permissive access to the
premises precluded a Fourth Amendment violation more
appropriately requires a determination of whether McArthur
consented to Aimee's search, or whether Aimee could have
consented to the search.

If Aimee could have consented to the

search, Officer Delahunty could have conducted the search
himself, and Aimee's actions as an agent would not have violated
the Fourth Amendment.

As set forth in A.O.B. at 22-30, Aimee did

not have "common authority over or other sufficient relationship
to the premises" (see State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 532 (Utah
App. 1998)) to consent to a search of McArthur's home.2

2

The state had the burden of establishing common authority.
See A.O.B. at 23.
While the state did not establish common
authority in the context of the entire house, it also failed in the
specific context of McArthur's bedroom.
While there was some
evidence that McArthur and Aimee might have shared a room at one
time, the evidence as a whole suggested that was not the case when
Aimee searched the house. R. 114:16, 78, 80. Delahunty did not
know if Aimee was "living with" Appellant, and both Delahunty and
Aimee referred to McArthur's bedroom as "his" bedroom, not "their"
bedroom. R. 114:16.
15

Aimee's permissive entry into McArthur's home does not
preclude Fourth Amendment protection.

Aimee's conduct as a

police agent in searching the house and taking items exceeded the
scope of any permission she had to be in the house as a guest.
Because the Koury holding referred to observations rather than
seizures, it does not control.

The appropriate inquiry is

whether Aimee could consent to a search.

Since she could not

consent, and under the totality of circumstances pursuant to the
test outlined in Watts, Aimee was a police agent, the Fourth
Amendment was violated when she searched McArthur's home and
seized items.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAUSED BY AIMEE
ACTING AS AN AGENT AND SEIZING ITEMS TAINTED THE SEARCH
WARRANT AND REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF THE ITEMS SEIZED
PURSUANT TO THAT WARRANT.
(Response to Point 11(a) of the State's Brief)
The search warrant was the fruit of the officer's illegal
activity and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be
suppressed.

See A.O.B. at 33-4.

Indeed, despite the fact that

Delahunty received information from Aimee on several occasions
prior to the search, he did not go about obtaining a warrant
until immediately after Aimee's illegal search.

No intervening

act occurred to purge the taint of that illegality and the search
pursuant to the warrant was not so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint of the prior illegality.

Because the illegal search

"prompted the securing of the search warrant" (see State v.
Becich, 509 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Or. App. 1973)) and the illegally
seized evidence was a "highly significant part of the affidavit"
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(see State v. Anonymous, 379 A.2d 946, 947 (Conn. 1997)), the
evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be suppressed.

See

A.O.B. at 33-4.
The state advocates that this Court simply excise the
illegally seized items and determine whether probable cause
remains.

In support of this claim, the state relies on State v.

Viqh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994), where this Court
upheld a search warrant because after stale portions were
excised, the affidavit nevertheless established probable cause.
Stale information is different, however, from illegally seized
information because stale information does not taint subsequent
actions.
Simply excising the illegally seized items would allow
officers who obtained a search warrant as the fruit of illegal
activity to benefit from that illegal activity if they were
nevertheless able to establish probable cause.

The exclusionary

rule purpose of deterring police misconduct is better served by
determining whether the taint of the illegality was so attenuated
as to be purged, as advocated in A.O.B. at 33-4, rather than
applying a mechanical test of whether the affidavit establishes
probable cause when the illegally seized evidence is excised.
Even if this Court applies the test advocated by the state,
when the illegally seized evidence is excised, the affidavit
fails to establish probable cause.

On page 25 of its brief, the

state outlines the remaining information if the illegally seized
items are excised.

However, this redaction does not establish
17

Aimee's reliability; nor does it include information that Aimee
was caught passing checks stolen in the burglary or that the
June 3 0 observations were made while she searched the premises
for Officer Delahunty.
While the information in the first three sentences
demonstrates that Aimee was aware of the burglary and saw items
at Dominic Newman's house, the importance of that information is
minimized since Aimee's reliability is not established.
Moreover, since Aimee was a potential co-defendant who was caught
forging checks stolen in that burglary, Aimee's credibility and
the reliability of her statements were highly suspect and do
little to establish probable cause.

In addition, the first three

sentences do nothing to suggest that any evidence would be found
in McArthur's home.
The remaining information is also misleading because Aimee's
reliability is not established.

Moreover, her credibility issues

are not included and the affidavit does not inform the magistrate
that Aimee entered the house on June 3 0 under false pretenses
after Delahunty agreed she should take certain items, transported
her to the house, and waited in the driveway.
The critical factor establishing probable cause was the
production of evidence seized from McArthur's house.

Officer

Delahunty's actions suggest that Aimee's word alone was not
sufficient.

Aimee had previously told Delahunty that items

stolen in the burglary were in McArthur's home.

Because of

Aimee's credibility problems, Delahunty did not obtain a search
18

warrant until she verified her statements by handing him a piece
of evidence under circumstances where he watched her enter and
leave the premises.
POINT II. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AIMEE WAS ACTING AS AN
AGENT, THE AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
WHEN THE MATERIAL OMISSIONS ARE INCLUDED WITH THE
INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT.
The state incorrectly contends several times in its brief
that this Court must examine the affidavit supporting the search
warrant only if Aimee is an agent for police officers.
9, 10, 11-12, 22.

S.B. at

Regardless of whether Aimee was an agent for

Delahunty, the intentional or reckless omission of the
information outlined in A.O.B. at 35-43 requires suppression of
the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, and the fruits
thereof.
The state claims that the omitted information regarding
Aimee's possible involvement in the burglary and her direct
involvement in passing the checks did not affect the existence of
probable cause in the affidavit because the missing information
actually bolsters Aimee's credibility.

S.B. at 28-9.

The

state's argument ignores the fact that Aimee did not implicate
herself; she pointed her finger at McArthur.

Any bolstering of

credibility which may arguably occur when one confesses to her
own involvement in a crime did not occur in this case.
Regardless of what Delahunty may have said to Aimee about her
pending forgery charges, it would have been reasonable for Aimee
to assume she would come out better if she helped officers
convict McArthur.
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Moreover, the lack of reliability of a co-defendant is well
accepted.

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135

(1968)(recognizing unreliability of a co-defendant's confession
implicating defendant); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183,
204 (1909)(recognizing lack of reliability and credibility of codefendant's statement implicating defendant).

From a common

sense perspective, a magistrate who was aware that the only
information supporting probable cause came from a possible codefendant would not find probable cause.

Moreover, Aimee's

forgery charges involved crimes of dishonesty, thereby
undermining her credibility.
The state also claims that Delahunty's omissions were not
intentional or reckless.

S.B. at 29-30.

As set forth in A.O.B.

at 3 7-9, Delahunty is charged with knowledge of the need for
accuracy and the importance of establishing the reliability of
the information.

Delahunty's actions in not obtaining a warrant

until after Aimee obtained items from the house are a strong
showing of intent.

Despite Aimee's information about McArthur's

involvement and statements specifying various items which would
be found in the house, Delahunty did not obtain a warrant until
after Aimee searched the house and took items.
items, he immediately sought a warrant.

Once she took the

This demonstrates that

he had misgivings about Aimee's reliability.

Given that

Delahunty was not willing to seek a warrant until after Aimee
seized items, Delahunty was well aware of the importance of
information regarding Aimee's forgery charges, possible
20

involvement in the burglary, and other omitted information.
Delahunty's awareness of the importance of this information and
his actions in not obtaining a warrant until after the search
show that Delahunty's omissions were intentional or, at the very
least, reckless.
POINT III. THE CLAIM THAT INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
MADE BY APPELLANT MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS THE FRUIT OF
THE POISONOUS TREE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The state maintains that Appellant's claim that his
statements to officers must be suppressed as the fruit of the
poisonous tree was not preserved for appellate review.
30.

S.B. at

McArthur entered a conditional plea, preserving the right to

appeal "the issue of the legality of the search warrant."

R. 51.

Pursuant to this conditional plea, reversal is required if the
evidence seized from McArthur's house and/or his statements
should have been suppressed.

In other words, regardless of

whether this Court reaches the confession issue, this case must
be reversed to allow McArthur to withdraw his plea if the search
warrant was invalid.

Hence, this Court need not get to the issue

of whether the incriminating statements are the fruit of the
poisonous tree in order to resolve the issues before it.
Contrary to the state's claim, however, McArthur's motion to
suppress expressly states, " [b]ecause the search warrant was not
supported by probable cause all evidence obtained as result of
the search should be suppressed including

to the police.
471

(1963)."

Wong Sun v.

United

States,

R. 26 (emphasis added).
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Defendant's

83 S.Ct.

confession

407,

371

U.S.

In argument to the trial

court, defense counsel reiterated that she was challenging all of
the fruits of the illegal search, including the confession.
R. 114:102.

Defense counsel stated:

We ask all of the fruits of this illegal search and
seizure be suppressed. That includes all of the

physical evidence; also, more importantly,
the
confession
that was taken from Mr. McArthur within 5 to
ten minutes of his -- of the execution of
warrants.
That's clearly a fruit of the search and should be
suppressed as well, your Honor.
R. 114:102.
Appellant's argument that his statements should be
suppressed is based on Wong Sun and its progeny and was raised in
the trial court.

See A.O.B. at 43-6; State v. Allen, 839 P.2d

291, 300 fn. 20 (Utah 1992).
The state challenged only the substance of Appellant's
Fourth Amendment claim and did not independently argue that even
if there were a Fourth Amendment violation, the confession was
not a fruit of that violation.

In other words, the prosecutor

did not claim that McArthur's statements were not the fruit of
the Fourth Amendment violation, perhaps because, assuming a
violation occurred, the statements were obviously a fruit of that
violation.

See R. 114:102-06.

Nor does the state argue on

appeal that the incriminating statements were sufficiently
attenuated from the police misconduct to allow admission of the
statements even if the police conduct violated the Fourth
Amendment.

See S.B. at 30-32.

Instead, the state argues that a

Fourth Amendment violation did not occur and even if one did,
McArthur did not preserve his argument that the incriminating
22

statements were the fruit of the poisonous tree.

S.B. at 30-32.

The general rule for preservation of an issue requires that
a defendant make a timely objection or motion in the trial court,
specifically noting the basis for the objection, and obtain a
ruling on the objection.

State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah

App. 1989), cert, denied,

795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Utah

R. Evid. 103(a).

The rationale for requiring a timely objection

is (1) "[a] timely objection provides the trial court with

x

an

opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate,
correct it, / n and (2) "eliminates the option of foregoing those
objections at trial as part of a 'strategy that counsel thinks
will enhance the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if
the strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the court
should reverse.'"

State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996)

(citations omitted).

Where the trial judge has had the

opportunity to address an issue, " [o]ne of the primary reasons
for imposing waiver rules" no longer exists, and "the
justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened
considerably."

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah

1991) .
In this case, Appellant made a specific objection to the use
of the evidence in the trial court.

The trial judge ruled on

McArthur's motion, concluding that there was probable cause to
support the search warrant and that "[t]here were no material
omissions made which would render the search warrant invalid."
R. 91.

These conclusions necessarily included a conclusion that
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McArthur's statements and other seized evidence were not the
fruit of the poisonous tree.

Indeed, since a Fourth Amendment

violation is a necessary prerequisite to a consideration of
whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression, a ruling that
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred necessarily includes a
ruling that the evidence need not be excluded as the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
Moreover, the purpose of the waiver rules would not be
served by requiring further argument or actions in order to
preserve the attenuation issue.

The trial judge was presented

with the argument, had the opportunity to rule on it, and
necessarily denied McArthur's claim when he denied the motion to
suppress.
Pursuant to the rule advocated by the state, even if a trial
judge concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation did not occur,
a defendant would be required to needlessly waste valuable trial
court time arguing further that evidence was the fruit of the
poisonous tree and obtaining a ruling which directly addresses
that subsidiary issue.

Such a preservation rule would be silly

since in any case where a judge has determined that a Fourth
Amendment violation did not occur, the judge would automatically
conclude that the evidence need not be suppressed.
For similar reasons, the state's argument that McArthur
failed to preserve this claim as part of his Sery plea is also
incorrect.3
3

S.B. at 31.

McArthur entered a conditional plea

State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988)
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pursuant to Sery, preserving "the issue of the legality of the
search warrant for appeal."

R. 51.

Moreover, at the plea

hearing, defense counsel stated " . . .
tendered under State v. Seary (sic).

these pleas will be

Should the Court of Appeals

rule that the search warrant was lacking in probable cause, and
that material omissions were made in obtaining the warrant,
Mr. McArthur would have the option of withdrawing his pleas of
guilty."

R. 115:1.

Defense counsel reiterated at the hearing

that the plea was made pursuant to Seryf and that McArthur "would
retain the right to withdraw pleas of guilty should the Court of
Appeals rule that the supporting affidavit for the warrant
executed in this case did not establish probable cause and
contained material omissions."

R. 115:2.

To the extent the

warrant lacked probable cause, due either to the information in
the affidavit or the material omissions, reversal is required to
allow McArthur to withdraw his plea.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Michael McArthur
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the
case remanded to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.
SUBMITTED this <£3/wl day of July, 1999.

c<My
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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